### 1

#### Trade Promotion Authority likely to pass but obstacles remain – it is vital to Obama’s trade agenda.

Politi, 12/6 (James, US economics and trade correspondent for the Financial Times, “Fast-track opens door for US TPP approval,” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ce008052-5dfd-11e3-8fca-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2miHER8ZD)

Senior US lawmakers have moved closer to a deal to grant President Barack Obama the authority to pass trade agreements swiftly and without changes through Congress, bolstering the White House’s position ahead of a key round of trade negotiations with Pacific nations. The breakthrough in recent days could lead to the presentation of so-called “fast track” legislation before the end of the year, and possibly as early as next week, say people familiar with the discussions. Also known as “Trade Promotion Authority”, such a bill would guarantee that Mr Obama’s sweeping second-term trade agenda, including deals with 12 Pacific countries and the European Union, would move through Congress on an expedited time line and without the possibility of amendments. This could remove a fair amount of the political uncertainty surrounding passage of the trade deals through the US legislature. The potential breakthrough comes as Michael Froman, the US trade representative, heads to Singapore over the weekend for a decisive round of talks on the creation of a Transpacific Partnership to slash tariffs and set trade rules among 12 nations, including Japan. Aides to the Senate finance committee and the House ways and means committee, which cover trade, have been working on a TPA bill for months, and progress has been much slower than expected, raising doubts about the political appetite for trade liberalisation in Congress. The original aim was to have leaders of the panels from both parties bless the deal, but Sandy Levin, the top Democrat on the ways and means committee, is not expected to sign on to the agreement. But Max Baucus, the Democratic chairman of the Senate finance committee, and Orrin Hatch, the panel’s top Republican, are on board, as is Dave Camp, the Republican chairman of the ways and means committee. Aides however cautioned that not all details had been sorted out yet. “We are getting close, but . . . not everything is locked in yet,” said one Republican aide. Another said they were “working to have something as soon as possible”.

#### Plan trades off

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Political capital is essential for TPA, which maintains US trade leadership, growth, and hegemony.

Riley and Kim, 13 (Bryan, Jay Van Andel senior policy analyst in trade policy for the Center for International Trade and Economics, and Anthony, senior policy analyst Center for International Trade and Economics, “Advancing Trade Freedom: Key Objective of Trade Promotion Authority Renewal,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/advancing-trade-freedom-key-objective-of-trade-promotion-authority-renewal)

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) has been a critical tool for advancping free trade and spreading its benefits to a greater number of Americans. TPA, also known as “fast track” authority, is the legislative power Congress grants to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. Provided the President observes certain statutory obligations under TPA, Congress agrees to consider implementing those trade pacts without amending them. More than a decade has passed since TPA was last renewed in 2002, and its authority expired in 2007. Reinstituting TPA may well be the most important legislative action on trade for both Congress and the President in 2013 given the urgency of restoring America’s credibility in advancing open markets and securing greater benefits of two-way trade for Americans. As the case for timely reinstallation of an effective and practical TPA is stronger than ever, the quest for renewing TPA should be guided by principles that enhance trade freedom, a vital component of America’s economic freedom. Emerging TPA Renewal Debates Both House Ways and Means Committee chairman David Camp (R–MI) and Senate Finance Committee chairman Max Baucus (D–MT) have announced plans to pursue TPA legislation. However, many lawmakers have correctly pointed out that a proactive push from President Obama is critical, given that trade bills have been a thorny issue for many Democrats in recent years. Historically, it has been common practice, although not formally required, to have the President request that Congress provide renewed TPA. In fact, except for President Obama, every President since Franklin Roosevelt has either requested or received trade negotiating authority.[1] After four years of informing Congress it would seek TPA at “the appropriate time,” early this year the Obama Administration finally indicated its interest in working with Congress to get TPA done. The President’s 2013 trade agenda offered the Administration’s most forward-leaning language yet, specifying that “to facilitate the conclusion, approval, and implementation of market-opening negotiating efforts, we will also work with Congress on Trade Promotion Authority.”[2] In the 2002 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, Congress—whose role in formulating U.S. trade policy includes defining trade negotiation objectives—made it clear that [t]he expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the United States. Trade is critical to the economic growth and strength of the United States and to its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships promote security and prosperity.… Leadership by the United States in international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace throughout the world.[3] Foster Trade Liberalization, Not Protectionism The Obama Administration often seems to regard trade as a zero-sum game of capturing value that would otherwise go elsewhere. However, trade liberalization is about creating and adding value, capitalizing on competitive advantages, and further harnessing the power of freedom and choice. Trade has been an integral part of America’s extraordinary economic progress over the past decades. Since 1929, trade volume has increased from less than 9 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) to around 30 percent, while real U.S. GDP per person increased from $8,000 to more than $43,000. This progress faces continuing threats, mainly from special-interest groups that malign free trade in an attempt to seek protection from competition at the expense of everyone else. Some lawmakers have even viewed TPA legislation as a vehicle to address the perceived costs of free trade for the U.S. economy. However, using TPA renewal to redress the suspected costs of trade is an ill-advised idea. TPA is an instrument that not only enables America to secure increased access to overseas markets but also provides the unique opportunity for the U.S. to reduce its own barriers and advance economic freedom. Congress and the President can help the American economy by removing barriers that limit its competitiveness. With open trade and investment ensured, the interplay of low tax rates and efficient regulations could effectively enhance America’s economic freedom. Entangling TPA with a protectionist agenda, on the other hand, would not serve America’s interests in the global market. Imports Do Support American Jobs The TPA renewal debate in Congress should reflect the fact that both exports and imports are job-supporting activities. In other words, the debate should focus on how to deliver greater trade freedom to Americans that advances the benefits of trade in both directions. It is a common misperception that importing goods to America comes at the cost of American jobs. In fact, imports contribute to job creation on a large scale. The increased economic activity associated with every stage of the import process helps support millions of jobs in the U.S. As shown by a recent Heritage Foundation study, for instance, over half a million American jobs—in fields such as transportation, wholesale, retail, construction, and finance—are supported by imports of clothes and toys from China alone.[4] Highlighting the dynamic and value-adding role played by imports in the U.S. economy, an empirical analysis published in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review presents strong evidence that “policies to bolster exports at the expense of imports would significantly harm U.S. manufacturing,” adding that “imports have played a critical positive role in boosting manufacturing output in the United States—much more so, in fact, than exports.”[5] Indeed, intermediate goods imports and capital goods imports are the lifeblood of U.S. manufacturing. Without them, manufacturing output is impossible. What Congress Should Do in Reauthorizing TPA While working constructively with the Obama Administration, Congress should: Grant long-term (at least five years or even permanent) renewal of TPA so that America’s credibility in pursuing free trade can be effectively restored; Insist on negotiating parameters that promote actual increases in international trade flows and guarantee reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment; Oppose any emphasis in TPA legislation on the promotion of exports over imports in recognition of the importance of both in increasing American jobs and prosperity; and Resist imposing any special sectoral or industry-specific requirements on negotiators, including in areas such as environmental and labor standards. A Unique Opportunity The threat to U.S. prosperity comes not from free trade but from the decline in economic freedom. In the process of working on TPA reauthorization, Congress has the unique opportunity to become an effective advocate for advancing economic freedom and help America reap the rewards that accrue from such policies. It should not let the opportunity pass.

#### Lack of US trade leadership causes world war from protectionist trade blocs.

Bergsten 97 – Peterson Institute for International Economics (Fred C., “Global Trade and American Politics”, September 27, 1997, The Economist, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc=pub&ResearchID=291

First, the United States remains the only plausible leader of far-reaching trade initiatives. As recently as 1993-94, the Clinton Administration dramatically reinforced that traditional American role by galvanising the final global agreement on the Uruguay Round in the GATT, concluding NAFTA, and winning political commitments to achieve free trade in the Western Hemisphere and the Asia Pacific. Using residual negotiating authority that carried over from the round and building on previous domestic legislation, the Administration drove to completion the recent worldwide agreements to eliminate tariffs on information technology products and to liberalise telecommunications services — the two main global advances since the end of the round in 1993. The European Union (EU), which is the only other potential global leader, will be too preoccupied with creating the euro and expanding its membership to provide leadership of world trade for some time. Second, for the next four years—the minimum result of a failure to win new negotiating authority. The United States led the agreement of the 34 democracies in the Western Hemisphere to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The United States turned the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), whose 18 members comprise half the world economy, into a substantive organisation by initiating annual summit meetings in 1993 and supporting its agreement to achieve “free and open trade and investment” by 2010 (for its industrialised members ) and 2020 (for the rest). The United States insisted that the World Trade Organisation agree to resume negotiations on agriculture, services and other central issues by 2000. American withdrawal from these initiatives would doom them all, threatening a reversal into protectionism. Third, American leadership has been crucial in assuring the compatibility, indeed the complimentarity, of regional and global liberalisation. Some purists have condemned the United States for deviating from the exclusive pursuit of multilateral agreements. But American strategy has promoted regional arrangements (starting with its pact with Canada and extending through NAFTA to the current FTAA and APEC initiatives) partly to press the more inward-looking EU and others to move ahead on the global path. Now that so many regional arrangements are in place or underway, America's defection could throw the whole process into reverse. Key groups—the EU, Mercosur and perhaps some new Asian groupings—could forget the global track and bring to life the much feared nightmare of a world of hostile trade blocs. Fourth, American trade policy itself could suffer irreparable harm from a failure of the current legislative effort. The United States is in its seventh year of expansion with unemployment and inflation at their lowest in decades. Its chief competitors in Europe and Japan remain mired in prolonged slumps. President Clinton was decisively re-elected a year ago and remains extremely popular. If the United States cannot pursue trade liberalisation now, when will it ever be able to? A failure, or a severe limitation on the use of new authority (e.g., to add only Chile to NAFTA), would represent a stunning victory for organised labor and others that oppose globalisation. Such a victory would be led by Congressman Richard Gephardt, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, and a likely presidential candidate in 2000. The United States has not had a protectionist President for a century (though Ronald Reagan's wrong-headed macroeconomic policies produced a spate of new import quotas) but such an outcome is by no means impossible if the present debate were to misfire. The countries that have taken out insurance policies against a US reversion to protectionism via free trade agreements, Canada and Mexico, have not idly overcome their historical aversions to getting into bed with their superpower neighbor. The Global Impact Would all this be so serious for the rest of the world? After all, the United States is no longer hegemonic in economic terms. Its share of world output has dropped below a quarter and its share of trade is even less. The EU is larger on both counts and the creation of the euro will end America's monetary dominance. Moreover, globalisation has enormous momentum. Big trade agreements have been proceeding without America. The EU brokered an interim financial services agreement in 1995 when America chose to stay out, is expanding its membership and heading toward mostly free trade with its Mediterranean neighbors by 2010, and is pursuing agreements with Mercosur and Mexico. Subregional pacts such as Mercosur and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement are moving ahead. Canada and Mexico have concluded their own free trade agreements with Chile. All these deals hurt the United States, by creating or threatening discrimination against it,—but this is nothing more than turnabout for America's own preferential compacts. The global problem is that American disengagement would puncture, and probably destroy, the prospects for consummating the extraordinarily promising scenario for world trade that has evolved since the end of the Uruguay Round and is now poised to proceed. That scenario has two related elements. The first is credible implementation of the two huge regional free trade agreements launched in 1994, the FTAA and APEC. Their conversion from political pledges to practical realities would provide huge new reductions of trade barriers. It would also bring irresistible pressure on the EU and others to avoid the risk of facing costly discrimination by joining a new global liberalisation initiative. APEC is particularly crucial to this strategy. Because of it's size, its pledge in 1994 to achieve free trade in the region is potentially the most far-reaching economic agreement in history. At the same time, its devotion to “open regionalism” means that it will offer to extend its liberalisation to non-members. The EU has always said that “it will not be left behind if APEC does what it says it will do,” as was indeed the case with the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) a year ago. APEC thus dramatically magnifies America's own effort to continue reducing global barriers. The second element in the global scenario would then be a major new effort in the WTO, perhaps the “Millennium Round” called for by Sir Leon Brittan or at least a simultaneous “round-up” of key issues as proposed by my colleague Jeffrey Schott. As in the past, rounds or round-ups that include a number of issues and sectors will be needed to meet the diverse interests of the full WTO membership and permit the necessary tradeoffs across topics that produce far-reaching liberalisation. It is true that the ITA and the telecommunications agreement represented victories for the sectoral approach but talks on maritime services collapsed and the outcome of the current renewed effort on financial services is unclear. A broader approach will almost certainly be required to provide substantial global progress. Once all the regional arrangements are on their way to being realised, about two-thirds of world trade will in fact have achieved, or be headed toward, barrier-free status. The WTO membership would then recognise that global free trade was a practical reality and guide the next round(s) by setting an explicit goal of reaching that milestone—perhaps by 2010 on the APEC and Euromed models. The WTO's director-general Renato Ruggiero, the Canadian government, and the declaration of the WTO's ministerial conference in Singapore last December have all already endorsed variants of that prospect. In addition, this scenario would decisively counter the risk that the regional pacts will become sources of new international conflict. Mr. Ruggiero has put it nicely: regionalism will undoubtedly continue to proliferate so the issue is whether the groupings go off on their own, with possibly disastrous consequences, or increasingly fuse into a common global context that eventually wipes out their preferential features. The latter outcome is obviously superior but the chances of reaching it would be severely jeopardised by a prolonged period of American inaction. There would be even bigger cost to the world from a failure of the Clinton fast-track effort: an enormous boost to the backlash against globalisation. Such a backlash is evident almost everywhere, from striking workers in France to the tirades of Malaysia's prime minister against international investors. There is some justice in the complaints. On balance, globalisation is clearly good for every country, but many governments have been slow to erect the necessary domestic complements. Without adequate safety nets to cushion adjustment burdens, and worker training that will convert potential losers into winners who can take advantage of the better jobs and higher wages that become available, political support for globalisation may be impossible to sustain. In this environment, victory for the anti-globalisation forces in the United States could have terrible global consequences. Defensive reactions would surface almost immediately, especially in the Asian and Latin American countries that depend most heavily on the American market. China, Russia and others could lose interest in further liberalisation and joining the WTO. A half century of global economic opening could stall or even be thrown into reverse. The broader international credibility of the United States would of course suffer severely as well, with substantial implications for international politics and even global security. It would be impossible for America to withdraw from such a central component of international affairs, or indeed repudiate initiatives undertaken with great fanfare by its own president and his predecessors, without jolting confidence in its staying power in other respects. Doubts about a sustained American presence would become particularly acute in Asia, where security considerations are a central (if largely unspoken) rationale for APEC, adding to future risks in the world's most volatile region. It would be the ultimate irony if “the only remaining superpower” entered the twenty-first century with a policy of disengagement on the very issues which most of the world, with the end of the Cold War, now places at the top of the international agenda.

Protectionism causes world war.

Panzer 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### 2

#### Economic engagement is a conditional QPQ

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagementshouldpromote China’s economic integration through negotiationsontrade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in FareedZakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

Vote negative

a) Limits – policies the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs

b) Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### 3

The United States federal government should

- ask the governments of Brazil and Mexico to diplomatically engage Cuba on its behalf

- inform Brazil and Mexico that it will abide by the results of negotiations

- implement any policy changes that negotiations between Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba.

Solves the case

Iglesias 12 – Commander of the US Navy (Carlos, “United States Security Policy

Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408~~)

Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not ¶ come from any continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International ¶ opposition to the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has¶ long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the global scale, the problem is epitomized by ¶ the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General Assembly resolution votes ¶ against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union partners have ¶ strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic, ¶ “since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would ¶ work, and (the next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has ¶ managed to generally retain positive feelings among the people of Latin American in ¶ spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The rise of Raúl and any subsequent ¶ successions further complicated the problem of mustering international consensus.¶ Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, ¶ Brazil and Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their ¶ interests in forging new ties since Fidel’s stepped down.99¶ On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for ¶ leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy ¶ actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of ¶ leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking¶ hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and ¶ Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have ¶ marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the ¶ island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be ¶ advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the ¶ potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).¶ 100Another potential gain for U.S. interests would be to upgrade its diplomatic ¶ presence on the island. For decades, the countries have reciprocated diplomacy ¶ marginalization with low-level “interest sections” in each other capitals. The fallback ¶ reasoning for the U.S. has always been that it did not want to appear to reward the ¶ GOC’s legitimacy with an embassy. This is myopic and inconsistent. The national ¶ strategy clearly promotes engagement in order to “learn about the intentions and nature ¶ of closed regimes, and to plainly demonstrate to the public within those nations that ¶ their governments are to blame for their isolations.¶ 101 Additionally, the diplomatic level is ¶ inconsistent with the longstanding U.S. accreditation of ambassadors to both friendly ¶ and hostile governments.102 An embassy in Cuba could support critical awareness and engagements. In the event of an opportunity or crisis, this presence could be the ¶ difference between knowing where, when, and with whom to act or just watching from ¶ across the Florida Straits.

### 4

**A. Discourses of danger reproduces an American identity – that posits the US as a the defender of global freedom and liberty**

**Campbell, 98**- Professor of International Politics University of Newcastle (David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity)

The crisis of representation the United States faces is unique only in the particularities of its content. The form of the dilemma is something common to all states. The state has never been a stable ground on which a fixed identity has been secured against danger: the variety of state forms throughout modernity have always been a historically contingent panoply of practices that have served to constitute identity through the negation of difference and the temptation of otherness. With the intensification of state power in the late nineteenth century, Foreign Policy helped contain and discipline the identities to which foreign policy had given rise. In our late modern era, where we find proliferating challenges that cannot be readily contained within the state, the discourse of danger associated with the discursive economy of foreign policy/Foreign Policy will have to work overtime to overcome the ever present threats to the once stable representation of an always unstable sovereign domain. The discursive economy of foreign policy will thus be taxed in its efforts to reproduce and contain challenges to the political identity of nations such as the United States. However, for (the United States of) America— which I have argued is the imagined community par excellence, the state that requires a discourse of danger probably more than any other— the crisis of representation is particularly acute. The operation of anticommunism as a prominent discourse of danger in the United States throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries— with its ability to encompass the entire population, intensively structure the practices of everyday life, and offer a link between internal and external threats in ways that circumscribe the boundaries of legitimacy— is probably the best example of an effective discourse of danger. But with (as discussed in the Introduction) the globalization of contingency, the erasure of the markers of certainty, and the rarefaction of political discourse, reproducing the identity of "the United States" and containing challenges to it are likely to require new discourses of danger. Of course, talk of a shift from old to new discourses of danger drastically oversimplifies the complexity of this cultural terrain. Transformations of this kind do not occur in discrete or sequential stages, for there has always been more than one referent around which danger has crystallized. What appears as new is often the emergence of something previously obscured by that which has faded away or become less salient. In this context, there is no shortage on the horizons of world politics of potential candidates for new discourses of danger (such as AIDS, "terrorism," and the general sign of anarchy and uncertainty). Consider just one example. The environment has occasionally emerged as an international discourse of danger. For example, a focus on the environmental catastrophes of Eastern Europe has been prominent. 2 One of the effects of this interpretation has been to reinscribe East-West understandings of global politics in a period of international transformation by suggesting that "they" in the East are technologically less sophisticated and ecologically more dangerous than "we" in the West. This produces a new boundary that demarcates the "East" from the "West" in a period when the old frontiers of identity are no longer sustainable. But environmental danger can also be figured in a manner that challenges traditional forms of identity inscribed in the capitalist economy of the "West." As a discourse of danger that results in disciplinary strategies that are de-territorialized, involve communal cooperation, and refigure economic relationships, the environment can serve to enframe a different rendering of "reasoning man" than that associated with the subjectivities of liberal capitalism, thereby making it more unstable and undecidable than anticommunism. 3 The major issues regarding the possible emergence of a new discourse of danger(s) in this period can be indicated by some questions. In terms of the reproduction of American identity along the lines established in the cold war, will any of the likely candidates be as extensive or intensive as that which they are needed to replace? In other words, are we going to witness the persistence of cold war practices even after their most recent objects of contention have passed on? Will these practices be represented in the mode of the society of security? Or, alternatively, do any of the new dangers being focused on in this juncture contain the possibility for a different figuration of American identity that would diverge from the enmity of the cold war? These questions, dealing with the rewriting of security, inform the argument in the remaining chapters. To make the analysis more specific, the first task is to consider an issue that has been officially identified a danger or threat necessitating vigilance and defense in the (so-called) post-cold war world: the incidence of drug consumption in America. Before proceeding, an observation about the strategy of argumentation employed in this chapter is in order. It begins with a consideration of the claims of "fact" made by the policy discourses to support their articulation of danger. In discussing counterevidence, my intent is not to juxtapose one realm of fact with another. To the contrary, my desire is to demonstrate that within each realm of policy discourse it is possible to construct, in its own terms, a competing narrative that denaturalizes and unsettles the dominant way of constructing the world, thus prying open the space for an alternative interpretation concerned with the entailments of identity. Indeed, although I begin this chapter by operating largely within the terms of these policy discourses, I have attempted to politicize the terms of the debate. For example, instead of "the drug problem" or "drug abuse" I speak of "drug consumption"; instead of "drug users" or "addicts" I speak of "drug consumers" or "people addicted"; and instead of "drug traffickers" and "cartels" I speak of the "drug industry." Of course, no representation is neutral, and the terms of my discourse are certainly contestable, but their estranging quality is designed to help make obvious the way in which formulations of identity are sequestered within even the technical arguments of public policy with which we are most familiar. 4 As such, this consideration of contemporary discourses illustrates the relevance to the current period of the idea that foreign policy/Foreign Policy is constitutive of political identity.

**B. That makes extinction inevitable**

**Willson, 02**- Ph.D New College San Fransisco, Humanities, JD, American University (Brian, “Armageddon or Quantum Leap? U.S. Imperialism and Human Consciousness from an Evolutionary Perspective”, [**http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html**](http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html))

Awaiting the impending U.S. government's concocted "preventive" war against Iraq (indeed, against the world), this is perhaps one of the most frightening moments in human history. In a surreal scenario, the U.S. government is renewing active threats of using nuclear weapons and reviving use of anti-personnel land mines, and is introducing new technological weapons of death we can only imagine, and some we cannot. As grim as this scene is, I believe it must be the inevitable and logical extension of the continued growth ad nauseum of the American Way Of Life (AWOL) in particular, and the Western Way Of Life in general. Premeditated murder of thousands--perhaps millions--of innocents is the price for AWOL's insatiable consumption and its bloodthirsty vengeance, totally abdicating responsibility for lethal consequences to the planet and its species, including, ironically, our own. Perhaps Gaia is presenting the current transparent dangers to us as like a cosmic gift so that we might actually be able to *see* the extraordinary folly of our ways in time to creatively "storm the Bastille."U.S. Terrorist Roots U.S. civilization was founded on and has been sustained by terrorism, facilitated by Eurocentric racism, classism, and arrogant ethnocentrism. The grossest irony of all, of course, is that the "War on Terror," to be successful, must focus on our own civilization, the most egregious proponent of terror the world has even known. Terror was systematically utilized since our country's beginnings in the 1600s. The following instructions, facilitated by a cruel racism, are part of the historic record: "burning and spoiling the [Indian] country," (Captain John Underhill, Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1636); "put to death the [Pequot Indian] men of Block Island" (Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop's order to Captain John Endecott, 1637); "laying waste," and instilling "terror...by any means" among the Indians (General George Washington, 1779); "[with] malice enough in our hearts to destroy everything that contributes to their support" (General John Sullivan, 1779).

In a prominent history book published in 1906 (*The History of the United States,* James Wilford Garner, Ph.D. and Henry Cabot Lodge, Ph.D, L.L.D), the "destruction" of the American Indian is explained as follows: "History teaches that inferior people must yield to a superior civilization....They must take on civilization or pass out. The Negro was able to endure slavery while learning the rudiments of civilization; the Indian could not endure slavery, and...refused to be taught." Attitudes uttered by white, Puritan, Christian men, civilian and military, thus set the tone for our civilization, sentiments that to this day have not been seriously renounced. We remain primarily a white male supremacy society with overtly expressed as well as suppressed sentiments of racism and classism dominating much of our political life and foreign policy. How can someone drop a bomb knowing that thousands of innocents will be murdered if the bomber is not possessed by cruel racism and/or ugly ethnocentrism? Conveniently left out of the historical record is the fact that our civilization has been founded on three holocausts, the first being theft of virtually all our land base at gunpoint while murdering millions of the original inhabitants. The second brought us "free" labor from Africa, but resulted in two-thirds of all those originally targeted for apprehension being murdered in the process of trying to escape or from being stowed as human cargo in slave ships known as floating coffins. The third holocaust took place during what the founder and publisher of *Time* and *Life* magazines, Thomas Luce, called "The American Century." This century witnessed more than 300 military and perhaps 10,000 covert interventions by the U.S. into more than 100 countries, stealing resources at gunpoint while murdering millions of the increasing numbers of impoverished people struggling for independence. "American exceptionalism" must succeed at *any* cost. In the process, the three Buddhist "poisons" are employed: greed -- for profit at any cost of human suffering; hatred -- of any obstacles to profit; ignorance -- of the intimate link between Western corporations/governments and "Third World" repressive regimes.  U.S. Oligarchy It does not matter which of the two parties, the republocrats or demoblicans, is in power. They both easily consented to the selection of their chief executive officer in violation of the rights of thousands of illegally disenfranchised Black voters, and of their Constitutional system itself that makes no provision for the Supreme Court to make such selection. Both believe in preserving the "national security" of AWOL, which means continued, unabated acceleration of extraction, consumption and pollution patterns, and obscene profits for the plutocrats and their bribed oligarchs in Washington. For all this to happen, Mr. Bush, indeed, has laid out the necessary plans for a world imperium to assure, in his and his cohorts' minds, continuation of our Western way of life, business- and profits-as-usual.  These oligarchs are not able to perceive the fact that further continuation of AWOL guarantees our destruction. They are not able to even consider the need for radical contraction and creative alternatives. They act as if blind drunk with their personal and political values of money and power, under the cloak of their disfigured version of Jesus. Unfortunately, the inevitable consequences of their business-as-usual forces are systematic destruction of virtually all sustainable ecosystems and human-created institutions.   Origins of "Civilization" Some history. As the revolution of urban civilization took root some 5,000 years ago the basic ingredients of "Western civilization" were introduced into our human evolutionary journey. The basic model of "civilization," for all but the most isolated and exceptional Indigenous groups, has seen the advent of powerful male oligarchs surrounded by elite bureaucracies of scribes and priests, overseeing hierarchies that involuntarily enforced large numbers of laborers, often violently captured during wars, to construct large projects for the pleasure of the king. Wars, systematic violence, and harsh class division originated with "civilizations." Secrecy of priestly knowledge about cosmic regularities and calendar-making assured that knowledge was monopolized by the small elite surrounding the oligarch. And the maxim, "the best defense is attack," was often used in early warfare, roots of our preventive strikes of today. According to Asian and Scandinavian scholars there have been nearly 15,000 wars during the last 5,000 years.   Extraordinarily Dangerous Trends The U.S. economy reveals increasing vulnerabilities to the fiction and hot air behind Wall Street and the continued exploitation and creation of misery upon which it is based. The U.S. regime has chosen to protect its illusion of omnipotence under the veil of fighting "terrorism" and its curtailing of civil liberties is similar to a police state. Increasingly desperate means used by people in power to maintain that power is a historically typical, predictable phenomenon. Never before, however, have oligarchs commanded so much power and possessed so many weapons of mass destruction, with explicit intentions to use such weapons preventively rather than defensively. I believe that we are at a pivotal point in history. We sit precariously perched on a ledge overlooking imminent extinction as a very real possibility at this juncture in our long, 7- to 8-million-year human evolutionary journey. Academics often talk about how history is cyclical, but two demonstrable trends, clearly not cyclical, indicate that we are dangerously near the end of our evolutionary branch

**C. Alternative text – reject the affirmative to desecuritize the Political. Vote negative to challenge securitization itself in favor of a political ethic that approaches problems in non-security terms and exposes the limits of their methodology.**

**D. Framework – security is a communicative action that requires discursive justification – there is an ethical responsibility to justify securitization in political discussion. The role of the ballot is to interrogate methodologies – to weigh their case the Aff has to legitimize securitization first**

**Williams, 03** [Michael – IR Prof @ University of Ottawa, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 511-53, Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association, JSTOR] <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693634>

A second major criticism of the Copenhagen School concerns the ethics of securitization. Simply put, if security is nothing more than a specific form of social practice-a speech-act tied to existential threat and a politics of emergency-then does this mean that anything can be treated as a "security" issue and that, as a consequence, any form of violent, exclusionary, or irrationalist politics must be viewed simply as another form of "speech-act" and treated "objectively"? Questions such as these have led many to ask whether despite its avowedly "constructivist" view of security practices, securitization theory is implicitly committed to a methodological objectivism that is politically irresponsible and lacking in any basis from which to critically evaluate claims of threat, enmity, and emergency.29 A first response to this issue is to note that the Copenhagen School has not shied away from confronting it. In numerous places the question of the ethics of securitization are discussed as raising difficult issues. As Wever has argued in relation to theorizing the highly sensitive issue of identity, for example, Such an approach implies that we have to take seriously concerns about identity, but have also to study the specific and often problematic effects of their being framed as security issues. We have also to look at the possibilities of handling some of these problems in nonsecurity terms, that is to take on the problems but leave them unsecuritized. This latter approach recognizes that social processes are already under way whereby societies have begun to thematize themselves as security agents that are under threat. This process of social construction can be studied, and the security quality of the phenomenon understood, without thereby actually legitimizing it. (1995: 66; see also Waever, 1999). As sustained as these considerations have been, it must be admitted that the answers are somewhat less searching than the questioning, and that this remains one of the most underarticulated aspects of securitization theory (Wyn Jones, 1999: 111-12). I would like to suggest, however, that there are two important issues at stake in these questions, each of which can be clarified through a greater recognition of the Schmittian elements of securitization theory. The first, and simplest point is that in some ways the Copenhagen School treats securitization not as a normative question, 27 I owe this insight especially to Didier Bigo. 28 Again, there are clear links here between securitization theory and classical Realism's stress on the "ethic of responsibility." 29 Voiced, for example, in Erickson (1999). These issues are, of course, also central to debates concerning social constructivismm ore generally.S ee in particulart he exchange between John Mearsheimer( 1994/95, 1995) and Alexander Wendt (1995). A broad overview can be found in Price and Reus-Smit (1998). 521 Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics but as an objective process and possibility. Very much like Schmitt, they view securitization as a social possibility intrinsic to political life. In regard to his concept of the political, for example, Schmitt once argued, It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or whether it is perhaps strong pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of making such a distinction. One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend-enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere (1996 [1932]: 28).30 In certain settings, the Copenhagen School seems very close to this position. Securitization must be understood as both an existing reality and a continual possibility. Yet equally clearly there is a basic ambivalence in this position, for it raises the dilemma that securitization theory must remain at best agnostic in the face of any securitization, even, for example, a fascist speech-act (such as that Schmitt has often been associated with) that securitizes a specific ethnic or racial minority. To say that we must study the conditions under which such processes. I would like to suggest that it is in response to these issues, and in regard to the realm of ethical practice, that the idea of security as a speech-actta kes on an importance well beyond its role as a tool of social explanation. Casting securitization as a speechact places that act within a framework of communicative action and legitimation that links it to a discursive ethics that seeks to avoid the excesses of a decisionist account of securitization. While the Copenhagen School has been insufficiently clear in developing these aspects of securitization theory, they link clearly to some of the most interesting current analyses of the practical ethics of social-constructivism. As Thomas Risse (2000) has recently argued, communicative action is not simply a realm of instrumental rationality and rhetorical manipulation. Communicative action involves a process of argument, the provision of reasons, presentation of evidence, and commitment to convincing others of the validity of one's position. Communicative action (speech-acts) are thus not just given social practices, they are implicated in a process of justification. Moreover, as processes of dialogue, communicative action has a potentially transformative capacity. As Risse puts it: Argumentative rationality appears to be crucially linked to the constitutive rather than the regulative role of norms and identities by providing actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and identities. When actors engage in a truth-seeking discourse, they must be prepared to change their own views of the world, their interests, and sometimes even their identities. (2000: 2)31 30 More broadly,i t can be argued that for Schmitti t was not only a possibilityb, ut a choice, a decision, that he paradoxically saw as necessary if a vital human life was to be lived. For an analysis of Schmitt in relation to a vitalistic romanticisma nd a virulenth ostilityt o liberalisms ee againW olin( 1992). Schmitt'sv italismm arkso ne of the clearest differences with the Copenhagen School, as discussed below. 31 Risse's analysis here draws greatly on that of Habermas. For Habermas's own treatment of speech-act theory see Habermas (1984). For Habermas's own views on Schmitt see Habermas (1990); a recent brief survey of the relationship between Habermas and Schmitt in the context of International Relations is Wheeler (2000), and a more extended and varied collection is Wyn Jones (2001). As speech-acts, securitizations are in principle forced to enter the realm of discursive legitimation. Speech-act theory entails the possibility of argument, of dialogue, and thereby holds out the potential for the transformation of security perceptions both within and between states. The securitizing speech-act must be accepted by the audience, and while the Copenhagen School is careful to note that "[a]ccept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as on consent," it is nonetheless the case that "[s]ince securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one's case"(Buzan et al., 1998: 23), and that "[s]uccessful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act: does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? Thus security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects"( 1998:31). It is via this commitment to communicative action and discursive ethics, I would like to suggest, that the Copenhagen School seeks to avoid the radical realpolitik that might otherwise seem necessarily to follow from the Schmittian elements of the theory of securitization. Schmitt appeals to the necessity and inescapability of decision, enmity, and "the political." He appeals to the mobilizing power of myth in the production of friends and enemies, and asserts the need for a single point of decision to the point of justifying dictatorship. He mythologizes war and enmity as the paramount moments of political life.32 By contrast, the Copenhagen School treats securitization as a social process, and casts it as a phenomenon largely to be avoided. Securitization is the Schmittian realm of the political, and for precisely this reason it is dangerous and-by and large-to be avoided.33 This element of the Copenhagen School is clearly illustrated in the concepts of "desecuritization" and "asecurity" which form integral aspects of securitization theory. As a consequence of their Schmittian understanding of security-and in contrast to many (indeed most) other forms of security studies-the Copenhagen School does not regard security as an unambiguously positive value. In most cases, securitization is something to be avoided. While casting an issue as one of "security" may help elevate its position on the political agenda, it also risks placing that issue within the logic of threat and decision, and potentially within the contrast of friend and enemy.34 "Security,"accordingly, is something to be invoked with great care and, in general, minimized rather than expanded-a movement that should be sought in the name of stability, tolerance, and political negotiation, not in opposition to it. "Desecuritization" involves precisely this process; a moving of issues off the "security" agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and "normal" political dispute and accommodation. The transformation of many elements of European security as part of the end of the Cold War stands as a key example (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup, and Lemaitre, 1993). Similarly, the concept of "asecurity" designates a (probably optimal) situation in which relations are so firmly "politicized" that there is little chance of them becoming re-securitized, a case that Waever argues is illustrated by the Nordic countries whose relations with each other constitute an "asecurity community" rather than a "security community" in the more conventional sense (Waver, 1998b). 32 See, for example, the direct discussion of-and partial contrast to-Schmitt's use of enmity in the construction of sovereignty in Waver (1995: fn. 63); Schmitt also figures in the analysis of religion as a "referent object" pursued in Bagge Lausten and Waver (2000:726, 733). 33 Here, too, the links to classical Realism are strong, for as William Scheuerman (1999) has brilliantly illustrated, this was precisely the tack adopted by Hans Morgenthau in his extended critical engagement with Schmitt. 34 Recognizing this particular Schmittian legacy hopefully also helps clarify the dispute between the Copenhagen School and those who think its scepticism toward the word and concept of "security" is politically debilitating. 523 Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics As a contribution to political practice, the sociological analysis of the Copenhagen School attempts to provide tools whereby these transformative processes can be fostered. By exposing the limits imposed by the securitization of specific issues, it provides resources for challenging these limitations. In presenting security as a speech-act, the Copenhagen School is doing more than developing a sociological thesis: it is presenting a political ethic. This does not mean that securitizations will always be forced to enter the realm of discursive legitimation. Indeed, part of the power of securitization theory lies in its stress on how "security" issues are often or usually insulated from this process of public debate: they operate in the realm of secrecy, of "national security," of decision. Equally, relations may be "sedimented" to such a degree that discursive ethics and tactics of social negotiation are unlikely to succeed and need to be subordinated (at least in the short term) to more traditional mechanisms of (relatively fixed) interest manipulation and material power balancing.35 These are key elements of any analysis of security policy. But the limitations should also not be overstated. As resistant as they may be, these security policies and relationships are susceptible to being pulled back into the public realm and capable of transformation, particularly when the social consensus underlying the capacity for decision is challenged, either by questioning the policies, or by disputing the threat, or both.36

### Multilat

#### War in the Middle East will never escalate to all-out war – conflicts remain relatively localized

Cook, Takeyh, and Maloney, 07 (Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ray, Senior Fellow For Middle Eastern Studies at the CFR, Suzanne, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, June 28, , online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13702/why\_the\_iraq\_war\_wont\_engulf\_the\_mideast.html, accessed December 25, 2007)

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else’s fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

**Unilateralism is what sustains primacy – other states bandwagon with the US for fear of other rising powers. Moving towards multilateralism makes it unsustainable**

**Seldena, 13** – assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida (Zachary, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony” Security Studies Volume 22, Issue 2, 2013, Taylor and Francis)

Understanding which of these choices—soft balancing against the hegemon or alignment with the hegemon—is more prevalent among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of American hegemony. The record of the 2001–2009 period indicates that a wide range of second-tier states not only aligned with the United States, they strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach of the us military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as unilateral. 3 In addition, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the endurance of American hegemony because states aligned with the United States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications. Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a formal security guarantee for their efforts. This may have implications for American foreign policy. There are distinct policy recommendations flowing from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations, which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the United States in the international system. 4 A policy of self-restraint would signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for the behavior of future great powers and recognize the emerging reality of a multipolar world. 5 Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that the United States should reduce its global military presence that both encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic decline by draining financial resources. 6 Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second-tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hegemony. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009 period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to international organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner that **raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments** or its willingness to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its national interests.

#### Obama administration is hard-lining Cuba

Haven 13 (Paul, Associated Prices, NY Times, “Cuba, US try talking, but face many obstacles”, 6/21/13 http://www.timesherald.com/article/20130621/NEWS05/130629930/cuba-us-try-talking-but-face-many-obstacles#full\_story)

To be sure, there is still far more that separates the long-time antagonists than unites them. The State Department has kept Cuba on a list of state sponsors of terrorism and another that calls into question Havana’s commitment to fighting human trafficking. The Obama administration continues to demand democratic change on an island ruled for more than a half century by Castro and his brother Fidel. For its part, Cuba continues to denounce Washington’s 51-year-old economic embargo. And then there is Gross, the 64-year-old Maryland native who was arrested in 2009 and is serving a 15-year jail sentence for bringing communications equipment to the island illegally. His case has scuttled efforts at engagement in the past, and could do so again, U.S. officials say privately. Cuba has indicated it wants to trade Gross for four Cuban agents serving long jail terms in the United States, something Washington has said it won’t consider. Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York who helped organize a recent U.S. tour by Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, said the Obama administration is too concerned with upsetting Cuban-American politicians and has missed opportunities to engage with Cuba at a crucial time in its history. “I think that a lot more would have to happen for this to amount to momentum leading to any kind of major diplomatic breakthrough,” he said. “Obama should be bolder and more audacious.” Even these limited moves have sparked fierce criticism by those long opposed to engagement. Cuban-American congressman Mario Diaz Balart, a Florida Republican, called the recent overtures “disturbing.” “Rather than attempting to legitimize the Cuban people’s oppressors, the administration should demand that the regime stop harboring fugitives from U.S. justice, release all political prisoners and American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross, end the brutal, escalating repression against the Cuban people, and respect basic human rights,” he said.

#### The AFF is appeasement

Walser 12 – Ph.D. and a Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation (Ray, “Cuban-American Leaders: “No Substitute for Freedom” in Cuba”, June 25 of 2012, <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/06/25/cuban-american-leaders-no-substitute-for-freedom-in-cuba/>)

However, these pleasing liberal assumptions are negated on a daily basis by hard-headed facts on the ground in Cuba. With each new step lifting restrictions on travel and remittances have come more demands for additional actions—not a reciprocal loosening of the regime’s grip on its citizens.¶ A one-of a-kind letter entitled “Commitment to Freedom,” signed by a distinguished battery of Cuban-American former senior executives for Fortune 500 companies and released on June 25, advises Washington and the Obama Administration to curb its enthusiasm for a policy of appeasement and concessions. It warns against falling for the Castro regime’s deceptive campaign to secure U.S. capital infusion and bank credits and lure some Cuban-American businessmen without ushering in a true economic and political opening.¶ The former CEOs argue that recent economic reforms heralded as game-changing are, in fact, “mostly cosmetic, heavily-taxed and revocable, and offer no legal protection or investment return.” The letter’s signatories further warn that the Castro regime “is seeking to divide and neutralize the Cuban-American community, and lure some of its businessmen, by selling the fallacious concept that there is no solution to Cuba’s predicament other than supporting cosmetic reforms without liberty and democracy.”¶ They are correct when they say the future “lies not with the current failed, octogenarian rulers, but with the leaders of the growing pro-democracy movement.”¶ The Obama Administration policy aimed at easing travel and remittances to Cuba has visibly failed to advance genuine economic or political freedom. With the unjust detention of American Alan Gross and the continual crackdown on dissent and protest, the regime cannot hide its iron fist of political repression.¶ It is time to take a tougher look at the shortcomings of U.S. Cuba policy and remind ourselves, as these former CEOs do, that when it comes to ending the tyranny of the Castro regime, there is “no substitute for freedom.”

#### Appeasement triggers multiple scenarios for nuclear

Hanson 9 - American military historian, columnist and the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution (Victor, “Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama: Answers from Victor Davis Hanson”, December 7 of 2009, Interview between Bernard Chapin and Hanson, <http://pjmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/>)

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world?¶ Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc.¶ BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage?¶ Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

### Ethanol

#### You don’t solve warming – your author

Specht 13 – Legal advisor, at Pearlmaker Holsteins (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Sugar Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States”, April 24 of 2013, <http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_specht/2/>)

It must be stressed that sugarcane-based ethanol, from Cuba or anywhere else, is not the solution to the energy and climate change problems faced by the United States, as replacing just 10% of global gasoline usage with sugarcane-based ethanol would require a tenfold increase in global sugarcane production. To address the problems of both peak oil and climate change, the United States must do much more to reduce its fossil fuel consumption. It should primarily do this by using the strategies highlighted in the introduction to this Article: higher fuel efficiency standards, electric cars (powered with electricity from renewable energy sources, not coal), more public transportation, more walkable neighborhoods, and shorter commutes. To the extent to which there will inevitably still be high demand for liquid fuels for automobiles, however, ethanol from Cuban-grown sugarcane can, and should, be part of the solution to both problems.

**China/Russia/India alt cause to warming – net-larger emitter that the plan doesn’t affect.**

#### Empirical trends disprove warming impacts

Goklany 11 - a science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior (Indur M., “Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming” December 2011, <http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf>, PZ)

Discussion and Conclusions **Despite claims that GW will reduce human well-being in poor countries, there is no evidence that this is actually happening**. Empirical trends **show that by any objective climate-sensitive measure, human well-being in such countries has improved remarkably over the last several decades**. Specifically, **agricultural productivity has increased; the proportion of people suffering from chronic hunger has declined; the rate of extreme poverty has been more than halved; rates of death and disease from malaria, other vector-borne diseases and extreme weather events have declined.** Together, these improvements correspond with life expectancy in poor countries more than doubling since 1900. **The fact that these improvements have occurred in spite of GW indicates that economic and technological development has been**, overall, **a very significant benefit to people in poor countries.**

#### Cuban econ resilient – other countries ensure no collapse

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at the University of California, San Diego. Senior Fellow at Brookings (“Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November 2011, Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/11/18-cuba-feinberg)

Since the collapse of its former patron, the Soviet Union, a resilient Cuba has dramatically diversified its international economic relations. Initially, Cuba reached out to Europe, Canada, and a widening array of friendly states in Latin America. Over the last decade, Cuba has reached out to forge economic partnerships with major emerging market economies—notably China, Brazil, and Venezuela. Spanish firms manage many of the expanding hotel chains in Cuba that cater to 2.5 million international tourists each year. A Canadian company jointly owns mining operations that ship high-priced nickel to Canada and China. In the next few years, China is poised to spend billions of dollars building a large petrochemical complex at Cienfuegos. A Brazilian firm will modernize the Mariel Port so that it can accommodate very large container ships transiting the newly widened Panama Canal. Petroleum companies from ten or more countries have lined up to explore for deepsea oil in Cuban waters in the Gulf of Mexico. Despite these advances, the Cuban economy remains in the doldrums (as described in Section 1). The main constraint slowing the Cuban economy is not U.S. sanctions (even as they have hit hard). Rather, it is Cuba’s own outdated economic model, inherited from the Soviet Union, of central planning. Cuba’s many commercial partners would like to invest more in Cuba and would prefer to purchase more Cuban exports to correct the imbalances in their bilateral trade accounts, but are frustrated by Cuba’s scant economic offerings

#### No impact to bioterror

Dove 12 [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶ Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶ Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so this release over the world’s largest city really represented a worst-case scenario.¶ Nobody got sick or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

#### You don’t solve production or demand – your author

Elledge 9 (Nicholas Elledge, Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Cuba’s Sugarcane Ethanol Potential: Cuba, Raúl Castro, and the Return of King Sugar to the Island,” The Panama News, November 3, 2009, http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v\_15/issue\_17/opinion\_13.html)

The Cuban government’s decision to disassemble most of Cuba’s aging sugarcane infrastructure stemmed from the belief that production of the commodity was no longer cost effective for Cuba. As Fidel Castro noted, “Why would we produce something that costs more to make than to import?” However, the inefficiencies that beleaguered the once-mammoth Cuban sugar industry are not systemic, but rather the result of fixable practices, obsolete infrastructure, and a lack of adequate investment. There is no reason why Cuba’s raw sugar and ethanol industry wouldn’t be profitable in a modernized market with successful technology sharing partnerships and the appropriate implementation of world-standard cultivation and refining techniques. In fact, such improvements do not even necessarily involve expensive new technologies --- as Dr. Brian H. Pollitt, a Cuban sugar expert from the University of Glasgow’s Institute of Latin American Studies, noted: “It was evident both that there was still great room for productive improvement and that most of it lay not in adopting novel or sophisticated techniques of cultivation, but in generalizing the mundane good tillage practice that could be observed on many small cane farms and CPAs [Agricultural Production Cooperatives] throughout Cuba.” Cuba’s ambitious push for a “Ten Million Ton Harvest” back in 1970 fell short of its goal but still resulted in an 8.5 million ton harvest. The government push to achieve such high production levels began a period of bad habits: inefficient seeding methods, inappropriate harvesting schedules, and faulty refining techniques. The milling season, for example, was extended 4-5 months into the rainy season, causing a predictable decrease in yield and considerable damage to agricultural machinery. A loss of sucrose content found in the cane and a decline in sugar quality occurred due to protracted delivery schedules as well as stoppages at the mills. Additionally, considerable mechanical problems during the following harvesting season were exacerbated by maintenance delays. By this time politically-driven Cuban officials set goals for sugarcane cultivation, regardless of the production cost, under the government slogan “Sugar to Grow,” institutionalizing such inefficiencies that have plagued the island’s sugar agroindustry. However, Cuba’s largest problem arose later, following the economic upheavals caused by the termination of Soviet patronage. After the demise of the Soviet epoch in 1989, the average level of production of Cuban sugarcane fell from 57.5 tons/hectare before 1990 to 22.4 tons/hectare in 2005. This plunge cannot be solely attributed to inclement meteorological conditions such as devastating hurricanes and tropical storms, as the Cuban government is wont to claim. The Dominican Republic experienced the same adverse weather conditions, yet it has increased its yield since 1999 to double that of Cuba’s today. Measures such as raising the sugarcane agricultural yield and standardizing efficient practices would be essential to bolstering Cuba’s sugarcane industry today.

#### Chavez’s death stabilizes Cuba now, no risk of collapse

Anya Landau French 13, Director of the New America Foundation U.S. – Cuba Policy Initiative, 3/6/13, “Can Cuba Survive the Loss of Chavez?,” http://thehavananote.com/2013/03/can\_cuba\_survive\_loss\_chavez

Not unsurprisingly, many in and out of Cuba now wonder if the loss of Chavez is the death knell of the Castros’ Revolution, or, perhaps could it inject urgent momentum into Raul Castro’s reform agenda, just in the nick of time? In some ways, the loss of Hugo Chavez, on its face so devastating for Cuba, might actually be a good thing for the island. With Nicolas Maduro a favorite to win the special presidential election a month from now, Cuba will likely retain significant influence. But Maduro is no Chavez. He’ll have to focus on building up his own political capital, without the benefit of Chavez’s charisma. While he surely won’t cut Cuba off, to maintain power he will almost certainly need to respond to increasing economic pressures at home with more pragmatic and domestically focused economic policies. And that likelihood, as well as the possibility that the Venezuelan opposition could win back power either now or in the medium term, should drive Cuban leaders to speed up and bravely deepen their tenuous economic reforms on the island. And if there was any hesitancy among Cuba's leaders to open more space between the island and Chavez, they now have the opportunity to do so. Under Raul Castro, Cuba has mended and expanded foreign relations the world over. Particularly if it shows greater pragmatism in its economic policies, countries such as China will no doubt increase economic engagement of the island. ¶ Raul Castro, who has at most five years – this second and final term as president - to save the fruits of the Cuban Revolution and chart a more sustainable course for the island, now has more incentive than ever to take the bull by the horns. Time will tell, perhaps sooner rather than later, whether he can.